

THE BENEFITS OF IMPLEMENTING ILP IN THE PORTS COCAINE TRAFFICKING INVESTIGATIONS AND CRIME PREVENTION IN BRAZIL

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ABSTRACT

Intelligence-led Policing (ILP) is a doctrinal and governmental agenda that has been present in global debates about the efficient and effective repression of crime since the late nineties. Its foundations have already been applied in different ways by countless law enforcement agencies in different countries. On the other hand, Brazil's position as a major cocaine export corridor to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, as well as the successful results that have been produced by the Brazilian Federal Police, together with national and international partners, to prevent and suppress this crime, have had wide worldwide repercussion. Within this context, this article aims at discussing the main doctrinal characteristics of ILP, analyzing whether it has been somehow employed in the Brazilian Federal Police' actions in the area of prevention and repression of cocaine trafficking by sea and, otherwise, the benefits of such use and the its potential in terms of qualified and effective police actions, mainly taking into account the formal and functional intelligence structures present in the institution.

KEYWORDS: Intelligence-led policing. Federal police. Organized crime. Repression and prevention of drug trafficking. Cocaine trafficking by sea.

SECTION ONE - INTRODUCTION

Brazilian Federal Police – BFP is a very well rated governmental organization in Brazil, trusted by around 70% of society¹. It is a

1 According to the latest Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (IBOPE - Inteligência) research, dated from jul/2019. Retrieved from <https://jornaldebrasil.com.br/politica-e-poder/nivel-de-confianca-em-presidente-da-republica-e-o-maior-desde-2013/>.

big law enforcement agency in a huge country, as far as Brazil is the world's fifth-largest country by area and the fifth most populous.

Even without the ideal logistics and human resources, BFP accomplishes with relative effectiveness its role and responsibilities, being Federal Police a reference in the country and worldwide regarding its investigations and special operations against transnational organized crime linked to drug trafficking on a large scale.

The organization has an interesting formal intelligence structure and has tried to share relevant information throughout this structure along the years, both with national and international partners.

Nonetheless, this paper aims to discuss if Brazilian Federal Police - BFP has effectively implemented the Intelligence-led Policing Doctrine and, if not, how beneficial it would be to do so considering a specific topic, which is one of BFPs' roles and currently a serious issue: the cocaine trafficking throughout Brazilian ports.

In this regard, and considering the hypothesis that BFP has not implemented intelligence-led policing (ILP) properly in the aforementioned area², it has been formulated the following research question: could intelligence-led policing (ILP) facilitate the ports cocaine trafficking investigations and crime prevention in Brazil?

In order to respond to that question, the study will initially go through some relevant definitions and characteristics regarding the Intelligence-led Policing Doctrine. Secondly, we are going to analyze some of BFP's roles and the existent structure to accomplish those roles, as well as the relationship between intelligence and investigations and some relevant data related to BFP's outcomes production in the specific area (ports cocaine trafficking investigations).

This analysis will provide the necessary background to conclude if Federal Police has implemented or not ILP, how and to

2 The hypothesis has been formulated based upon the author's 13 years of experience with drug trafficking investigations, especially in the city of Itajaí/Santa Catarina, where the 2nd Brazilian largest port complex is located. Also, it has been considered his current position as the Chief Advisor for the Combating Organized Crime Directorate.

what extent. Afterward, it will be possible to discuss and suggest some benefits that the proper implementation of ILP could bring out to the ports cocaine trafficking investigations and crime prevention in the country, which will necessarily take us to a few conclusions.

The importance of the research resides on the fact that nowadays Brazil is one of the most important ‘cocaine corridors’ in the world, from where huge amounts of cocaine have been shipped to many countries in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, fueling the transnational organized crime networks and even funding terrorist activities around the globe.

SECTION TWO - INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING - ILP

At the outset, it is essential to comprehend the main intelligence-led policing concepts, fundamentals, and characteristics.

As taught by Ratcliffe (2016) and Carter (2013), intelligence-led policing is not something new. Its philosophy goes back to the 90s in the UK, when “Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) released a report titled ‘Policing With Intelligence’” (CARTER, 2013, p.15). In the US, it was framed simultaneously with CompStat (in New York - NYPD) and problem-oriented policing. It has been formally adopted in Canada in 2000, in New Zealand in 2002, in Australia in 2003 and the UK in 2004, “as a law enforcement operational strategy that emphasizes the use of criminal intelligence when planning police tactics” (RATCLIFFE, 2016, p. 3), after evolving into a management model and data-driven movement.

The threats posed by globalized criminal organized groups that were ‘rearranging’ the illegal world during the 90s and, the necessity to overcome those times policing mindset, which was not combating crime efficiently anymore, were some of its fundamentals. Law enforcement agencies needed to be more effective and better allocate their resources against criminals that were spreading tentacles worldwide across different types of illegal businesses, and in this regard intelligence-led policing was brought out as an interesting initiative alongside others.

One of the main ILPs' initial goals was to move from a reactive to an information-based policing strategy, as far as the belief that high numbers of arrests and seizures would decrease criminality had been proved to be wrong.

Ratcliffe (2016, p. 5) offers the following concept:

Intelligence-led policing emphasizes analysis and intelligence as pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that prioritises crime hot spots, repeat victims, prolific offenders and criminal groups. It facilitates crime and harm reduction, disruption and prevention through strategic and tactical management, deployment and enforcement.

Jeremy Carter (2013, p. 15) states that “intelligence-led policing is the application of utilizing analyzed information to inform decisions, identify trends, and ultimately prevent threats”.

For David Carter (2009, p. 80), ILP is

The collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions that contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats.

These concepts reveal at least two key aspects for this article objective: ILP is potentially beneficial to overcome reactive-investigation models; and ILP's core is to produce and utilize intelligence as a means to assess and direct both strategic, tactical and operational law enforcement levels, integrating them. ILP's perspective is wider than the traditional focus on the individual cases. It is about using intelligence to drive operations and not the opposite. It is about to gather and analyze data to comprehend the what, where, when, who, why, and how of crime, enabling proactive policies and procedures on all levels (strategic, tactical, and operational) that will really impact criminality.

Undoubtedly, analysis is a keyword for the ILP process, and so it is important to examine it a little more deeply.

After reviewing a few models, including the traditional

intelligence cycle, Ratcliffe (2016, p. 81) adopts the so-called 3-I model (Figure 1 below) to conceptualize and characterize analysis in ILP, arguing that it “addresses a simple but broad conceptual framework for intelligence-led policing that is like to be applicable to most agencies”.




Figure 1 – 3-I Model. Source: Ratcliffe, 2016, p. 82.

Indeed, the 3-I Model, more than only conceptualizing analysis throughout an acronym, describes the ILP whole process, highlighting its object (the criminal environment), actors (police officers, analysts, and decision-makers) and surely the importance of crime intelligence analysis, as far as it has the (complex) aim of *interpreting* the criminal environment in order to *influence* the decision-maker, so he(she) can establish the best way (resources) to effectively *impact* the criminal environment.

In this regard, it is still important to set that ILP is not synonymous with criminal intelligence neither criminal intelligence analysis. Ratcliffe (2016, p. 5) states that the first concept “describes the result of the analysis of not only covert information from surveillance, offender interviews and confidential human sources (informants) but also crime patterns and other police data sources as well as socio-demographic and non-police information”. Boba Santos (2017, p. 97) clarifies that crime intelligence analysis “is the analysis of data about people involved in crimes, particularly repeat offenders, repeat victims, and criminal organizations and networks”.

The concept that we are writing about here is broader, being analysis one of its phases – an essential one – as aforementioned. Ideally, the analysis sources are various: crime and case reports; informants; social media; electronic surveillance; information sharing; interviews and interrogations; crime mapping; etc. Notwithstanding, it will only produce real and impactful outcomes if based on proper tasking definition (from or with decision-makers), collation, and hypothesis testing (strategic thinking). Moreover, the proximity with sworn and field officers³ is vital at all times, from collection to dissemination, passing through evaluation.

At the end of this topic, it is important to report that Ratcliffe (2016) and Carter (2013) suggest that intelligence-led policing is still an evolving concept, applicable to different countries according to their specific policing culture, structure and organizational complexities. Nonetheless, Ratcliffe (2016, p. 65) points out the following ILPs' characteristics:

- is designed to be a model for the business of policing;
- aims to achieve crime and harm reduction, prevention and disruption;
- focuses on crime hot spots, prolific offenders, repeat victims and active criminal groups;
- employs a top-down management approach;
- merges crime analysis and criminal intelligence;
- aids police resource prioritization decisions.

SECTION THREE - FEDERAL POLICE ROLES AND STRUCTURE: DRUG ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE

According to article 144 of the Brazilian Constitution, one

³ This is yet more relevant for countries where there is a civilian structure (staff) for criminal intelligence analysis, which is not Brazil's case.

of the Federal Police roles is to prevent, investigate and impose a crackdown on illicit drug trafficking, especially the interstate and international activities in this specific criminal area. The money laundering derived from drug dealing and smuggling is also a Federal Police responsibility.

It has been common sense for years that drug trafficking is one of the most profitable illegal activities worldwide. It has been too demonstrated how impactful and devastating the drug business is for communities, increasing violence and criminality in general.

In Brazil, it has not been different, and year after year cartels and criminal organizations like “Primeiro Comando da Capital” - PCC⁴ have become more and more powerful, active, and wealthy. For years now Brazil has held the position of 2nd largest cocaine consumer in the world, just after the USA. Moreover, the country has been considered one of the main corridors for tons of cocaine exported each year to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East⁵, especially throughout Brazilian ports.

Brazilian Federal Police, in coordination with other agencies on the federal, state, and local levels, as well as on the international level, has made many efforts trying to minimize this issue. To better understand that, it is essential that we provide an overview of the organization's structure.

BFP Headquarters is located in Brasilia/DF, the capital of the country. Its highest authority is the General-Director, pointed by the Minister of Justice and Public Safety. Bellow and pointed by him are eight Directors, who coordinate the following Directorates: Executive Directorate, Combating Organized Crime; Internal Affairs; Intelligence; Forensics; Human Resources Management; Logistics; and Information Technology. Each of the Directorates is supported by General-Coordinations, Coordinations, Divisions, and Services, according to their investigative, intelligence, and administrative roles.

4 First Capital Command, a criminal organization founded in São Paulo/SP during the '90s. At first, their objective was to fight against the 'injustices' of the prison system, but afterward, they become a powerful organization dedicated to robberies, kidnapping, and drug trafficking.

5 Among other various sources and researches, we can quote an “El País” report dated from 09/2014, retrieved from: https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2014/09/21/politica/1411333264_428018.html.

In each Brazilian State, BFP is regionally represented by a Superintendency, which hierarchically ‘mirrors’ the Headquarters structure. There are 27 Regional Superintendencies. Beneath them, in some strategic cities and regions, there are Local Units (precincts – ‘Delegacias’) or Temporary Units – 116 in total.

Figure 2 below summarizes the aforementioned structure:




Figure 2. Source: Brazilian Federal Police

The Combating Organized Crime (DICOR) is the Directorate where drug enforcement roles are assigned to, more specifically in the Drug Enforcement and Organized Crime General-Coordination (CGPRE). With the role of preventing and investigating national and transnational criminal organizations dedicated to drug and weapons trafficking, bank robbery, and some violent crimes, dismantling them, this General-Coordination is supported in Brasília/DF by one Coordination, two Divisions, and three Services, including an intelligence branch (SADIP). In theory, SADIP’s main core is to collect, analyze, and disseminate information and intelligence to support both the higher and lower hierarchical BFP levels on their strategic, operational, and tactical priorities and objectives.

Figure 3 below shows CGPRE’s structure:




Figure 3. Source: Brazilian Federal Police

In some specific regions and cities, CGPRE has installed the so-called Sensitive Investigations Units (GISEs) – 09 (nine) in total in the country. The GISEs’ main role is to conduct CGPRE’s most complex and sensitive investigations, among them the ports cocaine trafficking ones. With this same objective and according to yet more specific and dynamic criminal circumstances, there are currently 05 (five) temporary Operational Bases. Both the GISEs and Operational Bases also produce information and intelligence related to organized crime.

In the state level, inside the Superintendencies structure, BFP has Drug Enforcement Investigations Units (DREs), and in the majority of the precincts (Delegacias) the drugs smuggling investigations are coordinated by the Intelligence Units (UIPs) in articulation with DREs, GISEs, and Operational Bases - where they exist.

That being said, here resides a very relevant BFP’s functional aspect for this paper purpose: formal intelligence units running investigations and, on the other hand, formal investigative units

producing intelligence. And this is the origin of a misunderstanding that has been present in BFP for years: the technical confusion between the intelligence and the investigative roles. The overlap between two different fields of study.

As taught by Carter (2009, p. 9),

Intelligence is the end product of an analytic process that evaluates information collected from diverse sources; integrates the relevant information into a logical package; and produces a conclusion, estimate, or forecast about a criminal phenomenon by using the scientific approach to problem solving (that is, analysis).

The intelligence process (intelligence cycle) product is knowledge to law enforcement decision-makers regarding criminality, public safety, organized crime, and terrorism among other issues.

On the other hand, an investigation has to do with evidence production for a criminal case. The main objective of investigations is to collect information for the judicial system. As stated by Carter (2009, p. 9), “investigation is defined as the pursuit of information based on leads and evidence associated with a particularly defined criminal act to identify and apprehend criminal offenders for prosecution in a criminal trial”.

In this regard, it is – or it should be – clear that investigation and intelligence are not synonymous, even if both sometimes use similar scientific methods. “The intelligence function is often more exploratory and more broadly focused than a criminal investigation, per se” (CARTER, 2009, p. 9).

Despite this, and as aforementioned, in BFP we frequently have formal intelligence units conducting investigations and operations. The same team that produces or should produce intelligence also has the task of simultaneously searching for evidence in concrete cases. Although this can and, in fact, offer some advantages, like less ‘barriers’ and more cooperation between collection and analysis, field officers and analysts, undoubtedly it reinforces the misconception about the intelligence scope and the investigative function, especially when and where the agents are not

well trained and prepared to deal with both activities at the same time.

Narrowing this situation specifically to ports cocaine investigations, very dynamic per se, we necessarily have highly specialized teams investigating cases and consequently collecting a huge amount of data, at the same time making requirements and requests, (re)collecting, analyzing, evaluating and disseminating. And one of the effects of this workflow is that, in general, what ends up being disseminated is not intelligence as the product of the intelligence cycle, but raw information or information with poor analysis - what does not mean at all irrelevant information, it is important to refer.

As a conclusion for the topic, we can affirm that BFP's organizational structure in terms of drug enforcement investigations and intelligence producing on drugs overlaps. Therefore, often the same units that investigate, collecting a huge amount of data (for evidence producing), are also responsible for producing and disseminating intelligence.

SECTION FOUR - BFP'S OUTCOMES IN THE SPECIFIC AREA - ANALYSIS

At this point, it is relevant that we analyze some data regarding BFPs' cocaine seizures in Brazil and its main destinations when it is or it should be exported. Figure 4 below was provided by the Drug Enforcement and Organized Crime General-Coordination (CGPRE) in April/2020:




Figure 4. Source: Brazilian Federal Police - Drug Enforcement and Organized Crime General-Coordination (CGPRE)

The chart consolidates cocaine's seizures in Brazil made by Brazilian Federal Police from 1995 until december/2019. As we can easily conclude, cocaine seizures have increased in weight considerably over the years: considering only the last three years, between 2017 and 2018 they have increased 65%; and from 2018 to 2019 more 32% (117,91% if we compare 2017 and 2019).

Figure 5 below, also provided by the Drug Enforcement and Organized Crime General-Coordination (CGPRE) in April/2020, shows the main destinations of the cocaine loads seized in Brazilian ports.




Figure 5. Source: Brazilian Federal Police - Drug Enforcement and Organized Crime General-Coordination (CGPRE)

The numbers are impressive and for sure reflect the hard efforts that BFP, in cooperation with national and international partners, has made in the fight against transnational drug smuggling and organized crime.

Nonetheless, considering the known premise that law enforcement agencies have been able to seize only a small portion of the illicit drugs that are produced and commercialized worldwide, as well as an arise on cocaine production that has taken place in Peru and Bolivia⁶ recently, at least two questions come to mind: why have the seizures arisen year after year even with successful investigations and international partnerships? What haven't we been able to 'see' and consequently to do about this severe issue?

These questions take us back to the central objective of this research.

Obviously, the answers can't be offered with a simplistic view. However, considering the theoretical aspects that have been explored here it is essential to observe that the vast majority of BFPs' ports cocaine trafficking investigations start reactively, based upon three main sources: a specific seizure or series of seizures; a denouncement (*e.g.*, from a human source); or from operational information sharing. Indeed, from these starting points, BFP has developed efficient investigative procedures, with multiple means of proof, at the end seizing tons of cocaine, arresting dozens of criminals and confiscating properties and illegal assets. Moreover, along with the investigations, we collect a huge amount and terabytes of information from wiretappings, surveillances, interviews, interrogatories, documents, and IT devices apprehended, etc.

As an example, we can cite Operation White Ocean, conducted in Itajaí/SC by the local intelligence unit⁷. After 19 months of a complex investigation between 2016 and 2017, BFP seized in Brazil and abroad around 8.5 tons of cocaine, arresting

6 E.g, the following new: <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/26707/cocaine-production-is-spiking-in-peru-and-bolivia-and-it-could-keep-going-up>.

7 The author was the coordinator of the White Ocean Operation.

more than 40 people and apprehending documents and media in around 95 different places (search warrants for homes, offices, depots, etc.). It has been also seized and confiscated something around U\$30 million in properties and assets. Undoubtedly, a successful case that is still ongoing and accomplishes CGPRE's modern directive of prioritizing money laundering investigations with effective freezing and confiscation impacts to dismantle and disrupt criminal networks.

Despite this, the relevant point here is that, as far as it happens in the majority of the investigations - and there are many going on right now in Brazil - the material collected and apprehended during the White Ocean Operation was analyzed with the focus only on that concrete case, and by the local team. Even though during and after the investigation we shared information with other BFP units and international partners, the main focus was to produce solid evidence for that case – and some other ongoing cases. The vast majority of the information shared wasn't processed through the intelligence cycle, however remaining potentially available for that.

SECTION FIVE – THE POTENTIAL ILP BENEFITS FOR PORTS COCAINE TRAFFICKING INVESTIGATIONS AND CRIME PREVENTION

Considering what has been pointed out above, one necessary conclusion is that BFP has collected along with its ports cocaine trafficking investigations huge amounts of relevant data from various sources (*e.g.* SIGINT, HUMINT and OSINT). But, even though the organization has established efficient operational partnerships in Brazil and abroad, producing successful investigations, the data collected has been analyzed with the focus only on ongoing investigations, which means poor analysis or even no analysis on the Intelligence's perspective. And one of the reasons for this scenario is that a good portion of the teams still works with the belief that more seizures and detentions will reduce drug trafficking.

Nonetheless, as taught by Ratcliffe (2016, p. 2), “the police do not, however, arrest at a rate even close to making this a reality”.

Besides, the information that has been shared most of the time is raw information, not submitted to the proper methodology of the intelligence cycle. Among other potential shortcomings, this practice can be even impactful for civil rights protection, as stated by Carter (2013, p. 3): “most likely, as a result of uninformed practices, information sharing practices may also come dangerously close to depriving individuals of their constitutionally protected civil rights”.

Moreover, when comparing raw information and intelligence sharing Carter (2009, p. 81) reports the following benefits of the second: provides understanding instead of inputs; reduces uncertainty; and enables better decisions instead of only building awareness.

Therefore, it is possible to affirm that BFP has shared information through its existent intelligence and operational structures, but it is still far from implementing intelligence-led policing – at least for the ports’ cocaine smuggling theme.

What if the organization implements ILP as a philosophy and as a tool? How impactful could that be not only for producing better investigative results but, most importantly, to better comprehend this criminal enterprise (threat) in a broader perspective in Brazil and overseas, enabling BFP decision-makers and its partners to allocate resources more efficiently and even implement preventive measures?

Reflecting on the concepts and characteristics explained in the session two of this research and also based upon the BFP and Brazilian realities, it is finally important to write a few ideas regarding how ILP could be beneficial to BFP and its ports cocaine trafficking investigations, resources allocation, and issue prevention.

Initially, it must be remembered that CGPRE has a specific formal head intelligence unit, SADIP, which receives in a regular basis intelligence and information – even without a collection plan - from various sources, *e.g.* DREs; GISEs; UIPs; foreign law enforcement agencies; foreign intelligence agencies; Brazilian ports’ authorities;

federal and state prison system; Brazilian Customs; state polices; etc. Moreover, BFP, in a certain way, has an organizational top-down infrastructure (CARTER, 2009, p. 99) potentially able to work through the intelligence processes and ILP-based – maybe with some rearrangements needed.

However, even with a good information incoming flow, SADIP does not have an “Information Management Plan” (CARTER, 2009, p. 99), and so it is not common that SADIP processes the huge amount of information received through the intelligence cycle, thus producing and disseminating products based upon intelligence requirements. The unit most of the time focuses on trying to support DREs, GISEs, and UIPs on their cases or on providing elements for them to start a new case.

In this regard, it is stated here that SADIP should be turned into an effective intelligence unit, so developing a National Information Management Plan and, from this starting point, implementing ILP nationwide for the drug enforcement issue. Where it is the case – *e.g.* major States -, DREs in partnerships with GISEs could mirror SADIP’s structure and also develop regional plans.

Amid other themes, certainly ports cocaine trafficking would be one of the strategic priorities given its seriousness, consequently enhancing proper collection and analysis regarding the issue and thus potentially resulting in better resource allocation and more efficient and effective investigations.

Additionally, this aspect also takes us to another idea for this topic.

The Brazilian reality indicates that ports cocaine trafficking has been an issue most for BFP and some close partners like Customs. However, it is known that this serious problem should be considered for many other agencies like States polices, the prison system, port authorities, financial analysis agencies, etc., as far as this profitable and organized criminal enterprise involves much more than ‘only’ BFPs’ national and international responsibilities, *e.g.* increasing crime and violence rates in port cities and affecting the financial system.

In this context, there is no doubt that ILP could be very useful also to, based upon the products that will be released, engage and commit other agencies and even strategic private partners (CARTER, 2009, p. 116) in the fight against ports cocaine trafficking. Exemplarily, Customs and port authorities could become more committed with the collection process, as far as they hold a vast quantity of information and data they don't usually share. Besides, national and international policies and procedures related to ports' security could be intelligence-driven improved, thus contributing to prevention. In this regard, it should be said that during its investigations BFP gets in contact with most of the ports' perimeter security and operational vulnerabilities, which are explored by the criminals, most of the time not producing and disseminating intelligence about it.

At the end, it is necessary to refer that many other potential benefits from implementing ILP along with BFP's drug enforcement system, including ports cocaine investigations and the strategic policies and procedures regarding the issue could be analyzed and stated here, but unfortunately, there are space limitations for the research.

SECTION SIX - CONCLUSION

The main objective of this article was to study the existent structure in Brazilian Federal Police – BFP regarding ports cocaine trafficking investigations to assess if intelligence led-policing - ILP philosophy has been implemented somehow. Moreover, based on the hypothesis that it hasn't been implemented properly, another goal was to discuss the benefits that its implementation could bring up to the organization, partners, and society in terms of more efficient and effective investigations, strategic approaches, resources allocation, and prevention.

The conclusion is that even if BFP has established efficient operational partnerships in the country and overseas, with successful investigations, it still hasn't implemented ILP as a tool. BFP's organizational structure for drug enforcement investigations and intelligence producing on drugs overlaps, and huge amounts of relevant information from various sources (*e.g.* SIGINT, HUMINT,

and OSINT) remain unanalyzed or poorly analyzed within the intelligence cycle.

However, based on Carter's (2009) and Ratcliffe's (2016) lessons about how to develop and implement ILP, it is possible to take advantage of the existent formal structure to effectively incorporate ILP's philosophy within BFPs' drug enforcement role, including the ports' cocaine trafficking theme. This implementation would potentially produce at least five positive outcomes:

- to enhance proper collection and analysis on the ports cocaine trafficking issue in the country (and abroad), therefore allowing intelligence production and dissemination;
- better resources allocation;
- more efficient and effective investigations;
- more engagement and commitment from other agencies and even strategic private partners; and
- specific and general prevention.

Obviously, this is far from being an easy task. It involves political decisions, training, budget, internal culture-changing, etc. It is challenging to say the minimum. Nevertheless, it is necessary to take the first steps towards it, even if, as reported by Phillips (2012, p. 15), "bureaucratic law enforcement agencies change slowly". And it is necessary to do so with proper and committed leadership, as far as leadership is "the driving force of every agency or organization" (NCISP, 2013, p. 15).

In this regard, if this paper could somehow encourage the needed reflection and changes in BFP toward adopting intelligence-led policing as a philosophy and as a tool, at least initially for the ports' cocaine trafficking theme, the research will have been worthy. Certainly, more studies and high-level technical and political discussions are necessary, but this is aimed to be a small contribution to this challenging pathway.

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ÊNFASE NAS ÁREAS DE INTELIGÊNCIA, INVESTIGAÇÃO
POLICIAL E ENFRENTAMENTO AO CRIME ORGANIZADO

OS BENEFÍCIOS DA IMPLEMENTAÇÃO DA ILP PARA AS INVESTIGAÇÕES DE TRÁFICO DE COCAÍNA PELO MODAL MARÍTIMO E PARA A PREVENÇÃO DO CRIME NO BRASIL

RESUMO

Intelligence-led Policing (ILP) é uma pauta doutrinária e governamental que tem estado presente nos debates globais acerca da repressão eficiente e eficaz ao crime desde o final dos anos noventa. Seus fundamentos já foram aplicados de diferentes maneiras por inúmeras agências policiais em diversos países. Por outro lado, tem tido ampla repercussão mundial a posição do Brasil de grande corredor exportador de cocaína para a Europa, África e Oriente Médio, assim como os exitosos resultados que vem sendo produzidos pela Polícia Federal Brasileira para, em conjunto com parceiros nacionais e internacionais, prevenir e reprimir tal delito. Dentro deste contexto, o objetivo do presente artigo é discorrer sobre as principais características doutrinárias de ILP, analisando se de alguma forma tem sido empregada nas ações da Polícia Federal Brasileira na área de prevenção e repressão ao tráfico de cocaína pelo modal marítimo e, caso contrário, os benefícios que tal emprego tem o potencial de gerar em termos de ações policiais qualificadas e efetivas, principalmente levando-se em conta as estruturas formais e funcionais de inteligência existentes na instituição.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Intelligence-led policing. Polícia federal. Crime organizado. Repressão e prevenção ao tráfico de drogas. Tráfico de cocaína pelo modal marítimo.

LOS BENEFICIOS DE IMPLEMENTAR EL ILP PARA LAS INVESTIGACIONES DE TRÁFICO DE COCAÍNA POR VÍA MODAL MARÍTIMA Y PREVENCIÓN DEL DELITO EN BRASIL

RESUMEN

La Policía liderada por inteligencia (ILP) es una agenda doctrinal y gubernamental que ha estado presente en los debates globales sobre la represión eficiente y efectiva del crimen desde finales de los años noventa. Sus fundamentos ya han sido aplicados de diferentes maneras por innumerables agencias de aplicación de la ley en diferentes países. Por otro lado, la posición de Brasil como un importante corredor de exportación de cocaína a Europa, África y Oriente Medio, así como los exitosos resultados que ha producido la Policía Federal Brasileña, junto con socios nacionales e internacionales, y que han tenido una amplia repercusión mundial, con el objetivo de prevenir y reprimir tal delito. En este contexto, el objetivo de este artículo es discutir las principales características doctrinales de la ILP, analizando si ha sido empleada de alguna manera en las acciones de la Policía Federal Brasileña en el área de prevención y represión del tráfico marítimo de cocaína y, en caso contrario, los beneficios que tal trabajo tiene como potencial en términos de acciones policiales calificadas y efectivas, principalmente tomando en cuenta las estructuras de inteligencia formales y funcionales existentes en la institución.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Policía dirigida por inteligencia. La policía Federal. Crimen organizado. Represión y prevención del narcotráfico. Tráfico de cocaína por mar.

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